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ABSTRACT
We develop a stylized currency crises model with heterogeneous information among investors and
endogenous determination of interest rates in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium. Our model
captures three key features of interest rates: the opportunity cost of attacking the currency responds
to the investors' behavior; the domestic interest rate may influence the central bank's preferences for
a fixed exchange rate; and the domestic interest rate serves as a public signal which aggregates
private information about fundamentals. We explore the payoff and informational channels through
which interest rates determine devaluation outcomes, and examine the implications for equilibrium
selection by global games methods. Our main conclusion is that multiplicity is not an artifact of
common knowledge. In particular, we show that multiplicity emerges robustly, either when a
devaluation is triggered by the cost of high domestic interest rates as in Obstfeld (1996), or when a
devaluation is triggered by the central bank's loss of foreign reserves as in Obstfeld (1986), provided
that the domestic asset supply is sufficiently elastic in the interest rate and shocks to the domestic
bond supply are sufficiently small.
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1 Introduction
It is a commonly held view that ￿nancial crises, such as speculative attacks against a ￿xed exchange
rate regime, bank runs, debt crises or asset price crashes may be the result of self-ful￿lling expec-
tations and coordination failures in environments that are inherently unstable and admit multiple
equilibria.1 Building on game-theoretic advances by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), this view
has recently been challenged by Morris and Shin (1998), who argue that multiplicity may be the
unintended consequence of assuming that fundamentals are common knowledge among market par-
ticipants. Morris and Shin (1998) illustrate their argument with a currency crises model, in which
traders observe the fundamentals with small idiosyncratic noise, showing that this leads to the se-
lection of a unique equilibrium, whose outcome is uniquely determined by economic fundamentals.
While Morris and Shin￿ s analysis highlights the critical role of common information for enabling
coordination on one of multiple equilibria, their selection argument also requires the game￿ s payo⁄s,
in particular the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates, to be exogenously ￿xed. The
strategic interaction during a currency crisis is then viewed as a run on a ￿xed resource (i.e. the
central bank￿ s reserves), whose market value is out of line with fundamentals, and the model
abstracts from the speci￿c role of domestic interest rates. In other words, their model departs from
the multiple equilibrium models not only by introducing a lack of common knowledge, but also by
making very speci￿c assumptions about the market environment.
In this paper, we reexamine the forces underlying uniqueness vs. multiplicity in models of
currency crises, with a particular focus on the role of domestic interest rates. We consider a
stylized currency crises game with heterogeneous information among traders, in which we allow
for the endogenous determination of domestic interest rates, using a noisy rational expectations
equilibrium approach along the lines of Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and Hellwig (1980).
Our model captures three key features of domestic interest rates: First, the opportunity cost of
attacking the currency responds to the investors￿behavior; a lower demand for domestic assets
will increase their rate of return. Second, the domestic interest rate may in￿ uence the central
bank￿ s preferences for a ￿xed exchange rate: the central bank may abandon a ￿xed exchange
rate, either because of foreign reserve losses, or because the political and economic costs of rising
1This view has been formalized for currency crises by Obstfeld (1986, 1996), for bank runs, by Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), for debt crises by Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe (2000) and for asset price crashes by Gennotte
and Leland (1990) and Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), among others.Currency Crises and Interest Rates 3
interest rates become too large. Finally, when traders are heterogeneously informed, the domestic
interest rate serves as a public signal which aggregates private information about fundamentals.
Together these features enable us to examine to what extent the earlier arguments for multiplicity
under common knowledge survive in the presence of incomplete, heterogeneous information. In
particular, our model embeds as special cases the multiple equilibrium models of Obstfeld (1996),
where a devaluation is the result of costly increases in domestic interest rates, and of Obstfeld (1986)
and others, in which a devaluation is triggered by a run on foreign reserves, and is accompanied by
high domestic interest rates and a collapse in the supply of domestic bonds.
We analyze two di⁄erent versions of our model, ￿rst with common knowledge, then assuming
that traders have incomplete, but precise private information about fundamentals. In the latter
case, we introduce a shock to the domestic supply of bonds to prevent the domestic interest rate from
perfectly revealing the state. Our main conclusion is that multiplicity is not an artifact of common
knowledge. Irrespective of the information structure, our model features multiple equilibria, either,
when a devaluation is triggered by the cost of high domestic interest rates, or when the devaluation
outcome is determined by the central bank￿ s loss of foreign reserves, provided that the supply of
domestic assets is su¢ ciently elastic in the interest rate and/or supply shocks su¢ ciently small.
The ￿rst case corresponds to Obstfeld (1996), the second case to Obstfeld (1986). In contrast, when
devaluations are triggered by reserve losses and the domestic asset supply is su¢ ciently inelastic,
there is a unique equilibrium, in which the devaluation outcome is determined only by economic
fundamentals and exogenous supply shocks.
These multiplicity results are based on a comparison between the e⁄ects of domestic interest
rates on the return on domestic and foreign assets. On the one hand, an increase in the domestic
interest rate raises the return on domestic assets, which ceteris paribus reduces the traders￿will-
ingness to attack the currency. On the other hand, if an increase in domestic interest rates raises
the likelihood of a devaluation, this also increases the net return on foreign assets. The demand
for domestic assets trades o⁄ these two e⁄ects: If the e⁄ect on expectations about a devaluation
dominates the direct payo⁄ e⁄ect on domestic assets, the asset demand schedule may become lo-
cally decreasing in the interest rate, i.e. as the return on domestic assets increases, the demand for
these assets goes down. This may lead to multiple market-clearing interest rates. Moreover, any
equilibrium necessarily generates a ￿ crash￿ , whereby the equilibrium interest rate discontinuously
changes with fundamentals, triggering a discrete change in the probability of a devaluation.
In the case of Obstfeld (1996), when a devaluation is triggered by increasing domestic interestC. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 4
rates, traders do not face an explicit coordination motive conditional on observing the interest
rate. Consequently, the demand for domestic assets is uniquely determined, but non-monotonic:
As the domestic interest rate increases, it may reach a point, at which traders shift their portfolio
to foreign assets because they expect that the central bank is likely to devalue. This gives rise
to multiple market-clearing interest rates, with di⁄erent self-ful￿lling expectations about the de-
valuation outcome. In this case, multiplicity is not due to an explicit coordination problem, but
arises from the dual role of interest rates in determining the return to domestic bonds as well as
the central bank￿ s devaluation decision. Moreover, the absence of an explicit coordination prob-
lem carries over directly into the incomplete information model, and there are multiple equilibria,
almost irrespective of the information content of the domestic interest rate.
In contrast, when, as in Obstfeld (1986) or Morris and Shin (1998), a devaluation is triggered
by the loss of foreign reserves, multiplicity results from an explicit coordination problem among
traders, and the domestic interest rate merely adjusts to clear the domestic bond market. Under
incomplete information, the informational role of domestic interest rates in aggregating private
information then becomes important. In particular, we show that, if the domestic bond supply
is su¢ ciently elastic and/or shocks in the domestic bond supply are small, the information e⁄ect
associated with an interest rate increase becomes su¢ ciently important to dominate the payo⁄e⁄ect
and generate multiple equilibria. On the other hand, if the bond supply is completely inelastic or
the supply shocks are large, there exists a unique equilibrium, in which the central bank￿ s foreign
reserve losses and the devaluation outcome are uniquely determined by fundamentals and domestic
supply shocks.
In summary, our results show that many features of multiple equilibrium models of currency
crises, most notably the unpredictability of speculative attacks and the associated sudden jumps
in domestic interest rates, are robust to a lack of common knowledge. Indeed, the logic behind
the multiplicity results in Obstfeld (1986, 1996) is driven not so much by the assumption that
fundamentals are common knowledge, but by the dual role that interest rates play in coordinating
individual investment decisions, along with directly or indirectly determining the ultimate deval-
uation outcome. Our results further highlight the di⁄erence between foreign reserve losses and
interest rates as the driving forces behind the central bank￿ s decision to maintain or abandon a
￿xed exchange rate. All this is more appropriately captured within a rational expectations equi-
librium than by a stylized coordination game, which abstracts from the role of domestic interestCurrency Crises and Interest Rates 5
rates.
Related Literature: Following the original papers of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and
Morris and Shin (1998), several papers have studied the robustness of equilibrium selection to
exogenous public information and the e⁄ect of public information on coordination outcomes (see
for example, Morris and Shin 2003 and 2004, and Hellwig 2002). We build on their insights, but
endogenize public information by considering the informational role of interest rates. Furthermore,
in taking an agnostic view on uniqueness vs. multiplicity and focusing on endogenous features of
the information structure, the paper follows similar methodological grounds as Angeletos, Hellwig
and Pavan (2003, 2004).2
Atkeson (2000) is the ￿rst to discuss the potential problems that the lack of a theory of prices
poses for global coordination games. Tarashev (2003) analyzes a version of Morris and Shin￿ s
currency crises game with endogenous interest rate determination in a noisy rational expectations
equilibrium, in which he establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium.3 His result appears as
a special case of our model, in which a devaluation is triggered by reserve losses, and the domestic
bond supply is inelastic. Thus, the devaluation outcome is uniquely determined by fundamentals
and exogenous shocks to the domestic bond supply.
Closely related to our paper is Angeletos and Werning (2004). They consider a version of Morris
and Shin￿ s currency crises game, in which they allow for the aggregation of private information
through noisy public signals of aggregate activity, or through the price of a ￿ derivative￿asset in a
separate market; in their model, prices a⁄ect the coordination outcome only through the information
that they provide. They show that equilibrium multiplicity may be restored by the endogenous
public signal, provided that private information is su¢ ciently precise. In this environment, they
are the ￿rst to point out that multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria may arise from the
price function, while individual strategies are uniquely pinned down. While we share with them
the idea that information aggregation may restore multiplicity, in our model this occurs within a
primary market, in which the interest rate not only aggregates private information, but also has
direct e⁄ects on the traders￿payo⁄s and the eventual devaluation outcome.
Finally, the idea of multiple equilibria in asset pricing models due to non-monotone asset
demand and supply schedules also arises in traditional REE asset pricing models in which coordi-
2These papers study the informational e⁄ects of policy interventions (AHP 2003), as well as the consequences of
dynamic information ￿ ows in global coordination games (AHP 2004).
3Chari and Kehoe (2000) use a noisy REE approach to introduce prices in herding models.C. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 6
nation problems are absent, such as Genotte and Leland￿ s (1990) analysis of stock market crashes.
More recently, it appears in Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), where multiple market-clearing prices
and discontinuities in the equilibrium price function are due to the interaction between informed
and uninformed traders. Our discussion here shows, how a similar argument underlies multiplicity
of equilibria in models of ￿nancial crises.
2 Model description
Players, actions and payo⁄s: We consider an economy populated by a measure one continuum of
risk-neutral traders, indexed by i 2 [0;1], and a central bank (CB). Initially, each agent is endowed
with one unit of domestic currency. Traders can invest their endowment either in a domestic bond,
or they can go to the central bank and exchange the domestic currency one-for-one for a dollar.
The investment in the domestic bond yields a safe market-determined net interest rate r. The
return to exchanging the domestic currency for a dollar is determined by whether a devaluation
occurs. If there is no devaluation, and the dollar is converted back into domestic currency at the
same level, its net return is 0. However, if the CB decides to abandon the ￿xed exchange rate, the
exchange rate drops to 2 units of domestic currency for the dollar, and the net return on the dollar
is 1. These investment returns are summarized in the following table:
Devaluation No devaluation
Dollar 1 0
Domestic Bond r r
Devaluation decision: The central bank￿ s decision to devalue the domestic currency depends
on the market-determined domestic interest rate r, its loss of foreign reserves A 2 [0;1], which
measures the total of dollars withdrawn by traders, and an unobserved fundamental ￿, which
measures the strength of the CB￿ s commitment to maintain a ￿xed exchange rate. The net value
of maintaining the ￿xed exchange rate is given by ￿ ￿ U (r;A), and the central bank will devalue,
if and only if
￿ ￿ U (r;A). (1)
￿ may be interpreted as the value of the peg in the absence of any reserve losses or interest
rate increases, and U (r;A) measures the cost of having to defend the exchange rate in the eventCurrency Crises and Interest Rates 7







￿ 0, so that the value of maintaining the ￿xed exchange rate is non-increasing in both the
domestic interest rate and the loss of foreign reserves. This general formulation embeds two special
cases that are of interest: U (r;A) = r allows for a scenario, in which the CB is concerned exclusively
by high domestic interest rates, such as in Obstfeld (1996). On the other hand, U (r;A) = A
represents the case in which a devaluation is purely determined by the CB￿ s loss of foreign reserves.
This corresponds to the modeling assumptions in Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984) or
Obstfeld (1986).
Information structure and timing: The currency crisis game has three stages. In stage
1, nature selects ￿ 2 R, according to a common prior distribution characterized by absolutely
continuous cdf H (￿) and pdf h(￿). Then, each trader observes an idiosyncratic, private signal
about ￿, denoted xi. Conditional on ￿, private signals are independent, and identically distributed
according to cdf F (￿ j ￿) and pdf f (￿ j ￿). We assume that the support of xi is R, and F (￿ j ￿)
satis￿es the monotone likelihood ratio property, implying that F (￿ j ￿) is ￿rst-order stochastically
increasing in ￿.
In stage 2, the domestic bond market and the central bank open. Traders submit contingent
bids ai (r) 2 [0;1], which indicate, conditional on the market-determined domestic interest rate r,
what fraction of their wealth they wish to invest in the dollar. 1 ￿ ai (r) is then the bid submitted
to the domestic bond market. The supply of dollars is guaranteed by the central bank. The supply
of domestic bonds is exogenously given by S (s;r), a continuous function of the realized interest
rate r, and an exogenous supply shock s. s 2 R is independent of ￿ and the private signals, and is
distributed according to absolutely continuous cdf G(￿) and pdf g (￿). Once all bids are submitted
and the supply shock is realized, a Walrasian auctioneer selects an interest rate r to clear the
domestic bond market.
In stage 3, the CB decides whether or not to maintain the ￿xed exchange rate, after observing
￿, r, and the total of dollar withdrawals A.
Strategies and Equilibrium: In stage 2, each trader submits a contingent bid ai (r), condi-
tional on his private signal xi. We let a(x;r) denote the traders￿bidding strategy, which, conditional
on a private signal x and interest rate r, indicates a trader￿ s dollar withdrawal.4
4Note that we are restricting attention to symmetric bidding strategies, in which conditional on having observedC. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 8
Integrating individual bidding strategies over x, we ￿nd the total demand for dollars, or equiv-




The demand for domestic bonds is then given by 1 ￿ A(￿;r), and clearing the domestic bond
market requires
1 ￿ A(￿;r) = S (s;r): (3)
Therefore, the auctioneer selects an interest rate function R(￿;s), such that for each ￿ and s,
R(￿;s) clears the domestic bond market.
Now, suppose that the CB￿ s reserve losses are A(￿;r) and the auctioneer selects an interest
rate function R(￿;s). Let p(x;r) denote the posterior belief that a devaluation occurs, conditional
on observing a signal x, and conditional on the market-clearing interest rate being r. A bidding
strategy a(x;r) is optimal, if and only if
a(x;r) = 1, if p(x;r) > r
a(x;r) 2 [0;1], if p(x;r) = r
a(x;r) = 0, if p(x;r) < r
(4)
Equation (4) may be interpreted as an uncovered interest parity condition: r is the excess return on
domestic bonds. p(x;r) is the probability of devaluation, which here corresponds to the expected
depreciation of the domestic currency. Equation (4) thus states that optimal investment decisions
trade o⁄ the expected depreciation against the domestic interest rate premium. For any r, such
that f(￿;s) : r = R(￿;s)g is non-empty, Bayes￿Law implies that p(x;r) is given by
p(x;r) =
R
￿￿U(r;A(￿;r));r=R(￿;s) f (xj￿)h(￿)g (s)d￿ds
R
r=R(￿;s) f (xj￿)h(￿)g (s)d￿ds
. (5)
On the other hand, if f(￿;s) : r = R(￿;s)g is empty for some r, then r is never realized as a
market-clearing interest rate, and Bayes￿Law no longer determines p(x;r). We have the following
equilibrium de￿nition:
De￿nition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of a bidding strategy a(x;r), an interest
rate function R(￿;s), a reserve loss function A(￿;r), and posterior beliefs p(x;r) such that
identical signals, two traders submit identical bids. It is straight-forward to rule out equilibria with asymmetric
bidding strategies.Currency Crises and Interest Rates 9
(i) a(x;r), A(￿;r) and R(￿;s) satisfy, respectively, (2), (3) and (4), given beliefs p(x;r); and
(ii) for all r such that f(￿;s) : r = R(￿;s)g is non-empty, p(x;r) satis￿es (5).
The ability to submit bids contingent on r enables the traders to take into account the infor-
mation conveyed by the market-clearing interest rate. The interest rate r a⁄ects optimal bidding
strategies through two channels: On the one hand, there is a payo⁄ e⁄ect, since the return on the
domestic bond is increasing in r. This is captured by the right hand side of the optimality condition
p(x;r) R r. But r also appears on the left hand side of this optimality condition, capturing the
expectations e⁄ect of r: The market-clearing interest rate conveys information about the likelihood
of a devaluation and thereby a⁄ects the expected return on investing in a dollar. If this expectations
e⁄ect becomes su¢ ciently strong and positive, a marginal increase in r may raise the return on
the dollar by more than the return on domestic bonds, which in turn implies that the demand for
domestic bonds becomes decreasing in r. On the other hand, since p(x;r) 2 [0;1], the payo⁄ e⁄ect
dominates, whenever r < 0 or r > 1.
Functional form assumptions: We conclude the description of the environment with a
series of functional form assumptions for the information structure, the supply of domestic bonds
and the CB preferences that will enable us to arrive at closed-form solutions for our model.
(A1) Common prior: nature draws ￿ from an improper uniform distribution over the entire
real line.5
(A2) Private signals: xij￿ ￿ N
￿
￿;￿￿1￿
. ￿ thus denotes the precision of private signals
about ￿.
(A3) Central Bank preferences:
U (r;A) = ￿
￿
￿￿￿1 (A) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿1 (r)
￿
;
where ￿(￿) denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution, and ￿ 2 [0;1] is a parameter that
determines the CB￿ s weighting between the cost of high interest rates and reserve losses. If ￿ = 1,
U (r;A) = A and the CB cares only about reserve losses. If ￿ = 0, U (r;A) = r and the CB cares
only about interest rates.
(A4) Domestic bond supply:
S (s;r) = ￿
￿
s ￿ ￿￿￿1 (r)
￿
;
5This improper prior assumption is not essential for our results.C. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 10
where s ￿ N(0;￿￿1), i.e. the supply shock is normally distributed with the mean of zero, and
variance 1=￿.6 As we will discuss below, ￿ determines how much noise there is in the trading process
(equivalently, to what extent the interest rate is e¢ cient at aggregating private information). In the
limiting case where ￿ ! 1, r becomes fully revealing of the state; when ￿ ! 0, the supply shocks
become so big that r becomes totally uninformative. The parameter ￿ ￿ 0 re￿ ects the interest
rate elasticity of the domestic bond supply. Together ￿ and ￿ determine to what extent the bond
supply and, as a consequence of market-clearing, foreign reserve losses, are driven by interest rate
movements vs. exogenous supply shocks.
The assumption that ￿ is non-negative re￿ ects the idea that at higher interest rates, there is a
smaller net supply of domestic assets, and in equilibrium, a larger out￿ ow of foreign reserves; i.e. in
equilibrium net capital out￿ ows must be positively correlated with the interest rate. Although we
do not attempt to model this formally, di⁄erent motivations may be provided for this assumption
in the context of currency crises models. In Obstfeld (1986), there is a decrease in the domestic
money demand and an out￿ ow of foreign reserves at high interest rates because of in￿ ationary
expectations following a devaluation. In the presence of nominal rigidities, our assumption that
higher domestic interest rates coincide with larger net capital out￿ ows may also be motivated by
real investment behavior and ￿nancial constraints, implying that ￿rms are willing and/or able to
borrow less (and issue less domestic currency debt) at higher interest rates; this view is put forth,
for example, by the literature on ￿ Sudden Stops￿(cf. Calvo, 1998), or in many business cycle models
of emerging market economies.7 In summary, there are many economic mechanisms which suggest
that an increase in domestic interest rates may coincide with a reduction in domestic borrowing
and capital out￿ ows. As we shall see, this feature plays an important role in the existing multiple
equilibrium arguments.
3 Obstfeld (1986, 1996) vs. Morris & Shin (1998)
In this section, we review the main ideas of the second-generation currency crises models developed
by Obstfeld (1986 and 1996) and others in the context of our model, assuming common knowledge
of fundamentals. We then contrast these result with the private information model of Morris and
6At r 2 f0;1g and/or A 2 f0;1g, U (r;A) and S (s;r) are de￿ned by extention to the limit.
7See, for example, Neumeyer and Perri (2004) or Mendoza (2004). Neumeyer and Perri further document such a
positive correlation between net capital ￿ ows and domestic interest rates as a pervasive feature of business cycles in
emerging market economies.Currency Crises and Interest Rates 11
Shin (1998). Let￿ s suppose for the moment that ￿ 2 (0;1] is common knowledge among all traders
in stage two.8 With a slight abuse of notation, we let p(￿;r) denote the probability of a devaluation,
a(￿;r) individual bidding strategies and A(￿;r) the central bank￿ s reserve losses, conditional on ￿
and r. At the center of the analysis is the uncovered interest parity condition according to which
agents bidding strategies depend on whether p(￿;r) R r. As we will show next, the arguments for
multiplicity all rely critically on the fact that p(￿;r) is a non-monotone function of r. The models
di⁄er however in the economic mechanisms that deliver this property. We look at each one of them
separately.
3.1 Obstfeld (1996): devaluation triggered by high interest rates
Obstfeld (1996) argues that self-ful￿lling devaluations may be triggered by the cost of high interest
rates. High interest rates become self-ful￿lling, because they make a devaluation more likely: In one
equilibrium, investors expect a devaluation, which leads to a high domestic interest rate premium,
whose political and economic costs are unsustainable. In an alternative equilibrium, investors do
not expect a devaluation, and hence the resulting low interest rate becomes sustainable.
Within the context of our model, consider the case, where the central bank has preferences
only over the interest rates, i.e. ￿ = 0, and a devaluation occurs, if and only if ￿ ￿ r. In that case,
the probability of a devaluation has a particularly simple form:
p(￿;r) =
(
1 if ￿ ￿ r;
0 if ￿ > r:
: (6)
Therefore, optimal bidding strategies are characterized as follows: if r > 1, the domestic bond
strictly dominates the dollar, and a(￿;r) = 1. If r < 0, the dollar strictly dominates the domestic
bond, and a(￿;r) = 0. If r 2 (0;1), agents convert their endowment of domestic currency into
dollars, if and only if ￿ ￿ r. Finally, when r = 0, ￿ > r, a devaluation does not occur, and traders
are indi⁄erent between the dollar and the domestic bond. Similarly, when r = 1, a devaluation does
occur, and again traders are indi⁄erent. To summarize, optimal bidding strategies are characterized
8Given the functional form assumptions, it is easy to check that, if ￿ > 1 is common knowledge, there always
exists a unique equilibrium, in which r = A = 0, and no devaluation occurs. Likewise, if ￿ ￿ 0 is common knowledge,
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Figure 1: Obstfeld (1996), multiplicity caused by high interest rates
as:
a(￿;r) = A(￿;r) 2
8
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f0g if r > 1
[0;1] if r = 1
f1g if r 2 (￿;1)
f0g if r 2 (0;￿]
[0;1] if r = 0
f1g if r < 0
: (7)
Therefore, for each ￿ and r (with the exception of r = 0 and r = 1), the demand schedule
for domestic bonds, 1 ￿ A(￿;r), is uniquely pinned down, and is non-monotone in r. Moreover,
the domestic bond supply is exogenously given by S (s;r). We illustrate the equilibrium in the
domestic bond market in Figure 1, which plots the supply curve S (s;r) and the correspondence for
the domestic bond supply, 1 ￿ A(￿;r), as characterized by (7). We can see from this ￿gure that,
unless the domestic bond supply is perfectly elastic at some exogenous r, i.e. unless the supply
curve is horizontal, there are two market clearing prices. Given the functional form assumption for
S (s;r), there are multiple equilibria, irrespective of s. For any s and ￿ 2 [0;1], r = 0 and r = 1
both clear the domestic bond market. If r = 0, then S (s;0) = 1￿A(￿;0) = 1, and no devaluation
will take place. On the other hand, if r = 1, S (s;1) = 1￿A(￿;1) = 1, and a devaluation will take
place.
When the CB￿ s devaluation decision is in￿ uenced only by the cost of high interest rates, mul-Currency Crises and Interest Rates 13
tiplicity of equilibria arises from the existence of multiple market-clearing prices. This multiplicity
results, because the demand for domestic bonds is locally decreasing in r; at the point of this
non-monotonicity, i.e. at r = ￿, the increase in r leads to a discrete increase in the expected
devaluation premium, which more than o⁄sets the increase in the domestic bond return r. This
argument does not in any way require that traders have an explicit motive to coordinate individual
trading strategies, and conditional on r, traders do not need to make any forecast on what actions
the other traders are likely to take.
3.2 Obstfeld (1986): devaluation triggered by reserve losses
We next consider a case in which the central bank￿ s devaluation decision is driven only by reserve
losses. Here, we show that multiplicity results from an explicit coordination motive: In one equi-
librium, traders expect a devaluation, the interest rate premium is high, and there is a large loss of
foreign reserves which validates the traders￿expectations of a devaluation. In another equilibrium,
traders do not expect a devaluation, the interest rate premium is low and the loss of reserves small,
again validating the traders￿expectations.
Formally, suppose that ￿ = 1, i.e. a devaluation occurs, if and only if ￿ ￿ A. In that case, the
probability of a devaluation is given by
p(￿;r) =
(
1 if ￿ ￿ A(￿;r);
0 if ￿ > A(￿;r):
(8)
Hence, r 2 [0;1] a⁄ects individual decisions only to the extent that it enables them to coordinate
on either all attacking (in which case a devaluation occurs), or on not attacking; in other words,
r serves as a coordination device. Unlike the previous case, a(￿;r) and A(￿;r) are no longer
uniquely pinned down. In fact, for any r 2 [0;1], if all agents attack, a devaluation will occur,
and it is indeed optimal to attack, while, if no agent attacks, no devaluation will occur, and it is
optimal not to attack, i.e. for r 2 [0;1], both A(￿;r) = 0 and A(￿;r) = 1 are part of the best
response correspondence for the demand for domestic bonds. If r > 1, agents strictly prefer the
domestic bond, and if r < 0, agents strictly prefer to invest in the dollar. Finally, if r = 0, agents
are indi⁄erent between the domestic bond and the dollar, as long as ￿ > A(￿;r); hence any A < ￿
can be sustained as part of the demand correspondence. Similarly, if r = 1, agents are indi⁄erent,
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Figure 2: Obstfeld (1986), multiplicity caused by reserve losses
for optimal bidding strategies is given by:
a(￿;r) = A(￿;r) 2
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
f0g if r > 1;
f0g [ [A;1] if r = 1;
f0;1g if r 2 (0;1);
[0;A) [ f1g if r = 0;
f1g if r < 0:
(9)
In ￿gure 2, we again plot the demand correspondence for domestic bonds, 1￿A(￿;r), and the
supply S (s;r), for given s and ￿ 2 (0;1]. As long as ￿ > 0 (i.e. unless the bond supply is perfectly
inelastic), it is immediate that there are multiple equilibria: If r = 1, S (s;r) = 0, which clears the
bond market when A(￿;r) = 1, while if r = 0, S (s;r) = 1, which clears the bond market when
A(￿;r) = 0. Therefore, there are two equilibria, one in which the interest rate is high, reserve
losses large, a devaluation occurs, and all traders attack, and one, in which the interest rate is low,
reserve losses are low, no devaluation occurs, and no one attacks.
Figure 2 highlights the importance of the coordination motive among traders in generating
multiplicity in this environment. This coordination motive implies that the demand correspondence
is no longer uniquely pinned down for a given r 2 [0;1]. Multiple equilibria arise, because traders
can coordinate on multiple best responses to a given r. Market-clearing then requires that for
di⁄erent responses by traders, di⁄erent values of r must be selected to clear the market. TheCurrency Crises and Interest Rates 15
multiplicity argument is thus quite di⁄erent from the previous one, in which conditional on r,
bidding strategies were uniquely pinned down, but there were multiple market-clearing interest
rates.
The ￿gure also reveals the role played by the interest rate elasticity. Indeed, if the domestic
bond supply was in￿nitely inelastic, i.e. ￿ = 0, and S (s;r) = S 2 (0;1) for all r, there exists
a unique equilibrium, in which r 2 f0;1g adjusts so that 1 ￿ A = S, and in equilibrium, either
1 ￿ S ￿ ￿, in which case there is a devaluation and r = 1, or 1 ￿ S < ￿, in which case there is no
devaluation, and r = 0. Thus, if the domestic bond supply is perfectly inelastic, there is a unique
equilibrium, in which the ultimate devaluation outcome is purely driven by the fundamentals ￿,
and by the shocks to the domestic bond supply s, and r adjusts to clear the domestic bond market.
On the other hand, if ￿ > 0, there is room for multiple equilibria. In that case, as r increases, there
is a collapse in the domestic supply of bonds, and an increase in the loss of foreign reserves, which
makes a devaluation more likely, and thereby validates the initial increase in the interest rate.
While this basic argument is present in many currency crises models with multiple equilibria,
models may di⁄er in what leads to a self-ful￿lling collapse of the domestic bond supply. To our
knowledge, the argument is made ￿rst in Obstfeld (1986), where the domestic supply of bonds
has positive interest elasticity because of a time consistency problem in monetary policy: After a
devaluation, an in￿ ationary policy is anticipated, which leads to a self-ful￿lling collapse in domestic
credit and an increase in the domestic interest rate. However, there are other forces that give rise
to similar arguments: Higher domestic interest rates lead to a collapse of domestic investment, and
thereby reduce the demand for domestic credit, and the supply of bonds. To the extent that these
or similar forces are present, the analysis will give rise to results similar to the ones presented here.
3.3 Morris & Shin (1998)
In their in￿ uential (1998) paper, Morris and Shin argue that multiplicity of equilibria in models
of ￿nancial crises may be the artefact of assuming that fundamentals are common knowledge.
Morris and Shin￿ s argument is based on an equilibrium selection result for coordination games
by Carlsson and van Damme (1993). This argument relies in particular on the assumption that
conditional on the state, payo⁄s in the coordination game are exogenously ￿xed. Translated into
our environment, this condition requires that the domestic interest rate must be exogenously ￿xed
at some predetermined level r 2 (0;1), at which the supply of domestic bonds is in￿nitely elastic.
Fixing r exogenously further requires that the CB cares about reserve losses. Morris and Shin thenC. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 16
show that there is a unique equilibrium, if the information structure is characterized by assumptions
(A1) and (A2).
Proposition 1 (Morris & Shin, 1998) Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), with the domestic
bond supply in￿nitely elastic at r 2 (0;1), and a devaluation occurring i⁄ ￿ ￿ A, there exist
thresholds xMS, and ￿MS, such that in the unique equilibrium, agents attack, if and only if x ￿ xMS,
and buy the domestic bond otherwise, and a devaluation occurs, if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿MS. xMS and
￿MS are characterized by
￿MS = 1 ￿ r = ￿
￿p
￿ (xMS ￿ ￿MS)
￿
(10)
This uniqueness result therefore not only requires a departure from common knowledge in (A1)
and (A2), but also relies on speci￿c assumptions about the nature of the domestic bond supply and
the CB￿ s objective.
4 Equilibrium Characterization with heterogeneous information
In this section, we characterize equilibria of our currency crises game with heterogeneous informa-
tion and derive conditions under which there are multiple equilibria. We will restrict attention to
monotone strategy equilibria, which are characterized by thresholds x￿ (r) and ￿￿ (r) such that
a(x;r) =
(
1, if x ￿ x￿ (r);
0, if x > x￿ (r):
and the currency is devalued if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (r). With these bidding strategies, A(￿;r) =
F (x￿ (r)j￿) is decreasing in ￿. This in turn implies that for any r, there exists a unique ￿￿ (r), for
which
￿￿ (r) = U (r;A(￿￿ (r);r)) = U (r;F (x￿ (r)j￿￿ (r))), (11)
and a devaluation occurs if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (r). By standard representation theorems (Milgrom,
1981), p(x;r) = Pr(￿ ￿ ￿￿ (r)jx;r = R(￿;s)) is strictly decreasing in x, and there exists a unique
x￿ (r), such that
r = p(x￿ (r);r) (12)Currency Crises and Interest Rates 17
and r Q p(x￿ (r);r) whenever x Q x￿ (r). Thus, if the devaluation outcome is characterized by
a threshold rule ￿￿ (r), optimal bidding strategies are also characterized by a threshold rule, and
equilibrium thresholds x￿ (r) and ￿￿ (r) must jointly solve (11) and (12), given posterior beliefs
p(x;r).
To complete the equilibrium characterization, we need to determine the information conveyed
by r in equilibrium, and the conditional beliefs p(x;r). If agents use a threshold rule characterized
by x￿ (r), we have A(￿;r) = ￿
￿p
￿ (x￿ (r) ￿ ￿)
￿
, and S (￿;r) = ￿
￿
s ￿ ￿￿￿1 (r)
￿
. Since market-
clearing implies 1 ￿ A(￿;r) = S (￿;r), we have
1 ￿ ￿
￿p




s ￿ ￿￿￿1 (r)
￿
or









Therefore, R(￿;s) = r is admissible in equilibrium, if and only if ￿, s and r satisfy condition (13),
for all ￿, s and r. The LHS of this equation only depends on r, on which agents can condition
their bids. The RHS only depends on the unobservable shocks ￿ and s. Moreover, conditional on
￿, z is uncorrelated with private signals. Therefore, if the Walrasian auctioneer conditions r on
z ￿ ￿ ￿ s=
p
￿, selecting the same R(z) for any ￿, s, s.t. ￿ ￿ s=
p
￿ = z, z becomes a su¢ cient
statistic for the information conveyed by r on the equilibrium path.9 We thus have the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 (Information Aggregation) Suppose that all other agents follow a threshold rule
characterized by x￿ (r), and a devaluation occurs, whenever ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (r). Then,
(i) the information conveyed by r is summarized by





where z ￿ N(￿;(￿￿)
￿1); and
(ii) If fz : r = R(z)g is non-empty, the probability of devaluation p(x;r) is given by









9A technical problem arises if for given ￿, s, there are multiple market-clearing interest rates. In that case, if the
auctioneer were to condition R(￿;s) on ￿ and s separately, z would no longer su¢ ce as a su¢ cient statistic for the
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Part (i) immediately follows from the preceding arguments. Hence, conditional on ￿, z is
normally distributed with mean ￿ and precision ￿￿, z ￿ N(￿;(￿￿)
￿1). Part (ii) is a consequence
of the fact that a devaluation occurs, i⁄ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (r), and the conditional posterior of ￿ is normal,
given x and z.
Lemma 1 highlights the role of r in aggregating private signals. In equilibrium, r, or equiva-
lently, z, provides a normally distributed public signal of ￿. Moreover, its precision increases with
the precision of exogenous private signals ￿. Therefore, we have information aggregation: the more
precise exogenous private signals are, the more precise the endogenous public signal becomes. At
the same time, bigger shocks in the domestic bond supply (a smaller ￿) make r less informative.
Any monotone strategy equilibrium is thus characterized by an interest rate function R(z),
and thresholds fx￿ (r);￿￿ (r)g, s.t. for every z, (11), (12), and (14) are all satis￿ed, and p(x;r)
is given by (15). Solving these conditions, we provide a complete equilibrium characterization in
theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium characterization) Under the functional form assumptions (A1)-(A4),
￿￿ (r), x￿ (r) and R(z) characterize a monotone strategy equilibrium if and only if they satisfy the
following conditions.
(1) On the equilibrium path, ￿￿ (r) and x￿ (r) are uniquely characterized by
￿￿ (r) = ￿
￿￿














￿ (1 + ￿)
￿￿1 (r) (17)
(2) The equilibrium interest rate function R(z) is selected from a correspondence b R(z), which
is de￿ned as the set of interest rates r, which solve
r = ￿
￿p
￿ (1 + ￿)
￿
￿￿ (r) ￿




Theorem 1 highlights important equilibrium properties: First, for any r, optimal bidding strate-
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Figure 3: Unique equilibrium for all ￿
the interest rate function R(z) is selected from a correspondence b R(z). Therefore, to establish
uniqueness vs. multiplicity of equilibria, one must examine whether b R(z) is single-valued for all z,
or whether there is a non-empty subset of values z, for which (18) has multiple solutions. Equation
(18) is characterized by the uncovered interest parity condition which determines the traders￿op-
timal bidding strategies; this condition must hold with equality for the marginal agent who is just
indi⁄erent between converting to the dollar and buying the domestic bond. As in the game with
common knowledge, the scope for multiplicity arises from a trade-o⁄ between the payo⁄ e⁄ect of r
for the domestic bond, and its e⁄ect on the expected devaluation premium for the marginal agent:
when the latter is increasing in r, there is scope for multiple market-clearing interest rates for a
given z, and hence multiple equilibria. The following corollary provides necessary and su¢ cient
conditions, under which b R(z) is single-valued and the equilibrium is unique.
Corollary 1 (Uniqueness) There is a unique equilibrium, if and only if
p
￿ (1 + ￿)
p
1 + ￿ + ￿
￿









Condition (19) allows us to distinguish two di⁄erent scenarios:





￿ 0, the equilibrium is unique, irrespective of the precision of
private signals, ￿. This requires that ￿ be small, ￿ be small, and ￿ su¢ ciently large. In ￿gure 3, we
graphically represent ￿￿ (r) and R(z) for this case. Note that ￿￿ (r) is decreasing in r. Therefore,
the expected devaluation premium is decreasing in r, and there is a unique market-clearing interest
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Figure 5: Multiple equilibria, if ￿ is su¢ ciently large
This case mirrors the results in the benchmark game, when ￿ = 1 (i.e. the central bank cares
only about reserve losses), and ￿ = 0, i.e. the bond supply is perfectly inelastic; note that if ￿ = 0
and ￿ = 1, uniqueness is obtained irrespective of the size of supply shocks ￿. However, if either







> 0, the LHS of (19) is strictly increasing and unbounded in both
￿ and ￿, and therefore, there will necessarily be multiple equilibria, if ￿ and/or ￿ are large enough.
For this case, ￿gures 4 and 5 represent ￿￿ (r) and R(z), for di⁄erent values of the parameters ￿ and
￿. ￿￿ (r) is increasing in r, i.e. a higher interest rate leads to a higher devaluation threshold, and a
higher expected devaluation premium. If ￿ and/or ￿ are large enough, this leads to the possibility of
multiple market-clearing interest rates, and multiple equilibrium interest rate functions. Moreover,
any such equilibrium necessarily leads to a crash, i.e. the interest rate function must have a
discontinuity at some value of z. At that point, small changes in the underlying shocks lead
to large, discrete changes in the realized interest rate, and a discrete change in the probability
of devaluation. The necessity of such a discontinuity is highlighted in the right panel of ￿gure 5,Currency Crises and Interest Rates 21
which traces the correspondence b R(z). For extreme values of z, the correspondence is single-valued,
i.e. there is a unique market-clearing interest rate R(z). However, there exists an intermediate
range with multiple market-clearing interest rates. One easily observes that any selection from the
correspondence b R(z) must have a point of discontinuity, at which there is a ￿jump￿from the upper
to the lower branch of the correspondence.
This case mirrors our benchmark game, when ￿ is su¢ ciently small, i.e. when the central
bank is concerned only about high interest rates, or when ￿ is large, but ￿ > 0, provided that ￿
is also large enough, in which case the central bank is concerned about the loss of reserves, and
there is a positive supply elasticity in the bond market. Moreover, if ￿ < 1=2, the LHS of (19) is
strictly increasing in ￿, even if ￿ = 0, and multiplicity results even in the limiting case, where the
supply shocks in the domestic bond market become so large as to make the interest rate completely
uninformative.
That noisy rational expectations models of asset prices may give rise to multiple market-clearing
price functions is not unique to this model. Moreover, the basic intuition for multiplicity in such
environments is generally based on a similar trade-o⁄ between the payo⁄ and informational roles
of prices. For example, this argument is at the heart of Genotte and Leland￿ s (1990) analysis of
stock-market crashes with portfolio insurance; more recently, it appears in Barlevy and Veronesi
(2003), where multiplicity and asset price crashes come as the result of the interaction between
informed and uninformed traders.
Related to our analysis, Angeletos and Werning (2004) establish multiplicity of rational expec-
tations equilibria in a game in which traders can trade an asset prior to participating in a currency
crises game, where the latter is modelled as in Morris and Shin (1998). The asset￿ s dividends may
depend either on the same fundamentals, and/or on actions taken in the coordination game; the
asset market a⁄ects strategies in the coordination game only through the information content of
the price. In their environment as in ours, the agents￿strategies, conditional on observing the
price, are uniquely pinned down in equilibrium, but multiplicity results from the equilibrium price
function. This happens because when the dividend depends on the outcome of the currency run,
the asset price provides an endogenous signal about the likely strategies of other agents, i.e. the
aggregate size of the run. Given this information about the other agents￿strategies, each agent
has a unique best response. Similarly, equilibrium bidding strategies are uniquely pinned down
in our model even in the game where reserve losses matter, because the interest rate acts as anC. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 22
endogenous public signal of the foreign reserve losses A.
Finally, we note that multiple equilibria arise once ￿ is su¢ ciently high, i.e. when both private
and public information are su¢ ciently precise. In the next section we consider the special cases of
our model to examine the economic forces that drive these results.
5 Special cases of the general model
In this section, we reexamine the special cases of our model that we considered earlier, to examine
the economic reasoning behind the previous uniqueness vs. multiplicity results.
5.1 Special Case I: Obstfeld (1996)
We begin with the case where a devaluation is triggered by the cost of high domestic interest
rates. Suppose that ￿ = 0, i.e. the central bank devalues, if and only if r ￿ ￿. In this case,
the equilibrium characterization is particularly simple, since the devaluation threshold is given by
￿￿ (r) = r. Substituting into the uncovered interest parity condition, we ￿nd the following special
case of our main theorem:
Proposition 2 When ￿ = 0, ￿￿ (r), x￿ (r) and R(z) characterize a monotone strategy equilibrium,
if and only if
(1) on the equilibrium path, ￿￿ (r), x￿ (r) are given by





￿ (1 + ￿)
￿￿1 (r)
(2) R(z) is selected as a solution to:
r = ￿
￿ p
￿ (1 + ￿)
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When the CB is concerned only about the interest rate, demand and supply schedules were
uniquely pinned down under common knowledge, but there were multiple market-clearing prices.
With incomplete, heterogeneous information, we have a similar result. The devaluation outcome is






Figure 6: Reconsidering Obstfeld (1996) with heterogeneous information
any r and x. However, there may be multiple equilibria because there are multiple market-clearing
price functions, due to a demand for domestic bonds that is locally decreasing in the domestic
interest rate.
As in the benchmark model, an increase in r increases the range of states for which a devaluation
occurs, which increases the expected devaluation premium. In addition, when the selection R(z) is
monotone decreasing, an increase in r leads to inference that z is lower, which lowers expectations
about ￿, and increases the probability that ￿ ￿ r; this second e⁄ect becomes weaker as ￿ increases
and the interest rate signal becomes more noisy. However, when private information is su¢ ciently
precise, the ￿rst e⁄ect alone may already be su¢ cient to generate a demand for domestic bonds
that is decreasing in the interest rate, i.e. if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, there may be multiple equilibria,
even if ￿ = 0. Finally, as in the common knowledge benchmark, there is a unique equilibrium,
when the domestic bond supply becomes perfectly elastic (￿ ! 1), in which case r is exogenously
pinned down by supply. We plot the uniqueness conditions in Figure 6.
If a devaluation is solely triggered by unsustainably high domestic interest rates, then the
argument for equilibrium multiplicity that arises in Obstfeld (1996) is maintained, whenever private
information is su¢ ciently precise. This result does not rely on the informational role of interest
rates: if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, multiplicity arises for any value of ￿, i.e. even if the domestic bond
market is in￿nitely noisy, so that little or no public information is provided by the interest rate.C. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 24
5.2 Special Case II: Reconsidering Obstfeld (1986)
Next, we reconsider the model where devaluations are triggered by reserve losses. Setting ￿ = 1,
we have the following special case of Theorem 1 for the game with incomplete, heterogeneous
information:
Proposition 3 When ￿ = 1, ￿￿ (r), x￿ (r) and R(z) characterize a monotone strategy equilibrium,
if and only if
(1) on the equilibrium path, ￿￿ (r), x￿ (r) are given by













￿ (1 + ￿)
￿￿1 (r)
(2) R(z) is selected as a solution to:
r = ￿
￿ p
￿ (1 + ￿)
p
1 + ￿ + ￿
(￿￿ (r) ￿ z)
￿
:
The equilibrium is unique if and only if
p
￿ (1 + ￿)
p








Here, the possibility of having multiple equilibria depends on whether ￿ R
p
1+￿
￿ , i.e. whether
the domestic bond supply is su¢ ciently elastic, relative to the variance of the bond supply shocks,
￿￿1. If ￿ ￿
p
1+￿
￿ , the domestic bond supply is very inelastic, and supply shocks are large, i.e.
the equilibrium quantity of bonds is mostly driven by supply shocks. In that case, the devaluation
threshold ￿￿ (r) is decreasing in r, the expected devaluation premium is decreasing in r, and there




domestic bond supply is mostly driven by interest rate movements. In that case, ￿￿ (r) is increasing
in r, the probability of a devaluation is increasing in r and there are multiple market-clearing
interest rates, provided that ￿ is su¢ ciently large. We plot the uniqueness condition graphically in
￿gure 7.
Previously we argued that when the devaluation outcome is determined by foreign reserve
losses, traders face an explicit coordination problem, and under common knowledge, multiplicity
resulted from the fact that for any given r, traders could coordinate on multiple best responses.
With incomplete, heterogeneous information, the informational role of interest rates in aggregating
information then becomes very important, and r serves as an endogenous signal of the total loss








Figure 7: Reconsidering Obstfeld (1986) with heterogeneous information
a devaluation is unlikely, while when r is large, there is a large withdrawal, and a devaluation
is likely to occur. For this argument, it is important that the elasticity of the domestic bond
supply be su¢ ciently large: if the elasticity is low, variations in r only have a small e⁄ect on the
equilibrium level of reserve losses. In the extreme case when ￿ = 0, the devaluation outcome is
entirely determined by the level of fundamentals, and by the shocks in the domestic bond market,
and the interest rate merely adjusts to clear the domestic bond market. The uniqueness result in
Tarashev (2002) is based on this special case. However, this result is obtained irrespective of the
information structure.
5.3 Revisiting Morris & Shin (1998)
Finally, we return to the relation between our results and the results obtained by Morris and Shin
(1998). We also discuss how the supply elasticity parameter ￿ determines the relative strength of
the payo⁄ and expectation e⁄ects of the interest rate.
Previously, we argued that Morris and Shin (1998) have to assume that r is ￿xed and the
central bank is concerned about reserve losses only, to apply the global games equilibrium selection
results. Their model can be generalized to allow for the presence of exogenous public and private
information. Assuming that agents observe an exogenous public signal y ￿ N(￿;￿￿1) with mean ￿C. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 26
and precision ￿, the main result of the global games literature with public and private information





2￿, that is, if the precision of private signals is su¢ ciently high, relative to the













To compare this to our model, we consider the same payo⁄ assumptions as Morris and Shin.
First, we set ￿ = 1, so that the central bank is concerned only about reserve losses. In that case,














Second, note that as ￿ ! 1, the domestic asset supply becomes in￿nitely elastic at r = 1=2.
Therefore, we compare (22), taking the limit as ￿ ! 1, to (21), where we equate r to 1=2, set
the exogenous public signal y equal to the endogenous public signal z, and set its signal precision
￿ equal to the endogenous signal precision ￿￿. It follows immediately that the two equilibrium
conditions are equivalent. Moreover, taking the limit of (19), as ￿ ! 1, and ￿ = 1, there exists a




2￿. Since the precision of our endogenous public signal
z is ￿￿, this condition exactly mirrors the uniqueness condition of Morris and Shin.
Our model thus embeds Morris and Shin￿ s analysis as a special case, albeit with a key di⁄erence,
since the precision of the public signal is endogenously determined from the precision of private
signals. In the limiting case that we have considered here, this information aggregation is completely
unmitigated: in the limit as ￿ ! 1, the domestic interest rate purely serves to aggregate private
information r is exogenously pinned down, and since interest rate ￿ uctuations vanish, they have
no direct payo⁄ e⁄ects on traders￿strategies. In this case, the above condition for equilibrium
uniqueness also mirrors the one in Angeletos and Werning￿ s (2004) model of information aggregation
through a derivative asset market: Since in their model the derivative price has no e⁄ects on payo⁄s
in the coordination game, uniqueness vs. multiplicity is determined purely by the extent to which
the price provides public information, i.e. by the uniqueness condition given above. Information
aggregation then overturns the Morris-Shin limit uniqueness result and leads to multiplicity when
exogenous private information and the endogenous public signal are both su¢ ciently precise.Currency Crises and Interest Rates 27
For ￿nite values of ￿, interest rate ￿ uctuations become su¢ ciently large so that the information
e⁄ect of an increase in r is mitigated by its payo⁄ e⁄ect in raising the return to domestic bonds.










￿￿, i.e. the condition for multiplicity becomes
more stringent away from the limit; moreover, the multiplicity region shrinks, as ￿ decreases. The
reason is the following: the more inelastic the supply of domestic bonds, the less the equilibrium
loss of foreign reserves responds to the interest rate, and the less a given change in the observed
interest rate is indicative of a large change in foreign reserves. Therefore, increases in the elasticity
parameter ￿ leave the overall information content of the interest rate unchanged, but alter the size
of payo⁄ e⁄ect relative to the information provided by a given change in r. Consequently, when ￿
becomes su¢ ciently small, there is a unique equilibrium. In the limit when ￿ = 0, the bond supply
is given by ￿(s), the loss of foreign reserves is 1 ￿ ￿(s), and a devaluation occurs, if and only if
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(s), i.e. the ultimate devaluation outcome is uniquely pinned down by the exogenous
fundamentals, just as in the common knowledge game.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the role of domestic interest rates in a stylized global game of cur-
rency crises. We have taken a noisy REE approach with heterogeneously informed traders, in which
the market-clearing interest rate serves to aggregate private information. Our analysis shows that
multiple equilibria in models of ￿nancial crises are not the artefact of assuming that fundamentals
are commonly known, but result from the dual role that interest rates play in coordinating indi-
vidual investment decisions, along with directly or indirectly determining the ultimate devaluation
outcome. This, however, is not captured by a stylized global coordination game, which abstracts
from the role of interest rates.
At the same time, our analysis also reveals new insights that would not have been possible
under common knowledge, and it suggests new avenues for future research. For example, we have
argued that information aggregation through interest rates tends to be most destabilizing and in-
duce multiple equilibria, when it is not mitigated by direct payo⁄ e⁄ects, i.e. when the domestic
bond supply is perfectly elastic. This insight may be useful for understanding the informational
connections between primary and derivative markets and suggests a potential argument why deriv-
ative markets may have a destabilizing e⁄ect on primary markets, since derivative prices aggregate
information without the mitigating payo⁄ e⁄ects that results from price movements in the primaryC. Hellwig, A. Mukherji, and A. Tsyvinski 28
market. Another question, which our model may be apt to address is the e⁄ects of public informa-
tion disclosures in the context of ￿nancial crises. We leave an analysis of these questions for future
work.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Substituting the market-clearing condition z = x￿ (r) ￿
￿ p
￿￿￿1 (r) into
the interest parity condition, we ￿nd
r = ￿
￿p







or, after solving for x￿ (r),









Now, the devaluation condition is
￿￿ (r) = ￿
￿
￿￿￿1 (A) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿1 (r)
￿
, where A = ￿
￿p
￿ (x￿ (r) ￿ ￿￿ (r))
￿
Therefore, substituting the previous expression for x￿ (r), we ￿nd ￿￿ (r) as a function of r:

















Thus, we have solved for x￿ (r) and ￿￿ (r) as functions of r.
Proof of Corollary 1. To establish uniqueness, substitute x￿ (r) and ￿￿ (r) into the interest
parity condition to ￿nd:
1
p



















(￿￿ (r) ￿ z)
￿￿1 (r) =
p
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This implicitly describes the correspondence b R(z) of market-clearing prices. Necessarily b R(z) is
single-valued whenever the derivative of the RHS w.r.t. ￿￿1 (r) is smaller than 1, for all z. However,
when the slope of the RHS locally exceeds 1, there exists values of z, s.t. b R(z) takes on multiple
values, and hence there are multiple equilibria. Taking the derivative of the RHS w.r.t. ￿￿1 (r),
we ￿nd p























Since ￿(￿) is bounded above by 1 p
2￿, the equilibrium is unique, whenever
p










+ 1 ￿ ￿
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p
2￿